by Jason M. Zuckerman and R. Scott Oswald[1]
Recognizing the critical role that
whistleblowers play in exposing financial fraud, threats
to public health and safety, and fraud on the
government, Congress has recently enacted numerous
robust whistleblower protection laws and strengthened
existing whistleblower protection statutes. For example,
the Dodd-Frank Act includes three new whistleblower
retaliation causes of action and strengthens the
whistleblower retaliation provisions of the False Claims
Act and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. In addition to the
expansion of whistleblower protection law at the federal
level, several states have strengthened their
whistleblower protection statutes and the common law
wrongful discharge tort continues to expand. The
proliferation of whistleblower protections at the
federal and state level is an important development for
qui tam relators’ counsel in that prospective clients
who seek advice on potential qui tam actions may also
have strong retaliation claims. This article aims to
assist counsel in identifying and evaluating
whistleblower retaliation claims and formulating a
strategy to maximize the whistleblower’s recovery.
The article discusses the following recently enacted and
recently enhanced federal whistleblower protections:
Section I Retaliation provision of the
False Claims Act
Section II Retaliation provision of the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act
Section III Retaliation provision of the Federal
Acquisitions Streamlining Act and a provision
specifically protecting Department of Defense employees
Section IV Retaliation provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act (SOX)
Section V Retaliation provision of the Consumer Product
Safety Reform Act
Section VI Retaliation provisions of the Consumer
Financial Protection Act of 2010
Section VII Whistleblower reward and retaliation
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act
Section VIII Retaliation provision of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act
In addition, the article discusses the common law
wrongful discharge tort and state whistleblower
protection statutes (Section IX), and offers tips on
claim selection, forum selection, maximizing damages,
pleading whistleblower retaliation claims and
prosecuting whistleblower claims (Section X).
FALSE CLAIMS ACT RETALIATION PROVISION, 31 U.S.C. §
3730(H)
The retaliation provision of the FCA provides robust
protection to any employee, contractor, or agent who is
“discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed,
or in any other manner discriminated against in the
terms and conditions of employment because of lawful
acts done by the employee, contractor, agent or
associated others in furtherance of an action under this
section or other efforts to stop 1 or more violations of
this subchapter.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). Section 3730(h)
plaintiffs must allege three things: (1) that they
engaged in protected conduct, i.e., acted in furtherance
of a qui tam action; (2) that the defendants knew that
the relators were engaged in this protected conduct; and
(3) that the defendants were motivated, at least in
part, to terminate the relators because of the protected
conduct. See Brandon v. Anesthesia & Pain Management
Associates, 277 F.3d 936, 944 (7th Cir. 2002). Section
3730(h) protects not only individuals who bring qui tam
actions, but also individuals who take steps to expose
fraud, including investigation of a potential qui tam
action or supplying information that could prompt an
investigation. See Neal v. Honeywell Inc., 33 F.3d 860,
864-65 (7th Cir. 1994).
In the past year and a half, Congress has twice
strengthened the retaliation provision of the FCA. The
Fraud Enforcement Recovery Act of 2009 (“FERA”), Pub. L.
No. 111-21, § 4(d), 123 Stat. 1617, 1624-25 (2009),
amended § 3730(h) by expanding the scope of coverage to
expressly protect independent contractors, and expanded
the scope of protected conduct to cover “efforts to stop
1 or more violations” of the FCA. The Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 1079B, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (“Dodd-Frank
Act”), enacted on July 21, 2010, enhanced § 3730(h) by
prohibiting associational discrimination, applying a
uniform three-year statute of limitations and broadening
the scope of protected conduct.
A. Scope of Coverage
Section 3730(h) protects not only employees of
government contractors, but also contractors, agents,
and associated others. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h).
Expanding the scope of coverage under § 3730(h) twice in
the past two years, Congress has clarified that any
individual in the private sector who suffers retaliation
for taking any action in furtherance of a potential qui
tam action has a remedy under § 3730(h).
B. Protected Conduct
Protected conduct under § 3730(h) includes “lawful acts
done by the employee, contractor, agent or associated
others in furtherance of an action under this section or
other efforts to stop 1 or more violations of this
subchapter.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). Protected conduct
includes internal complaints about what an employee,
contractor, or agent reasonably believes to be a
violation of the FCA. See, e.g., Fanslow v. Chicago Mfg.
Ctr., Inc., 384 F.3d 469, 481 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding
that employee’s internal complaints about alleged
misappropriations of federal funds to government
official can constitute protected conduct under FCA);
Neal v. Honeywell Inc., 33 F.3d 860, 865 (7th Cir. 1994)
(court specifically rejected argument that plaintiff
must raise her concerns directly to government to
qualify for protection, noting that it was appropriate
for plaintiff to complain through corporate channels).
A “protected activity” is defined as that activity that
reasonably could lead to a viable FCA action. See
McKenzie v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 219 F.3d 508,
516 (6th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). A plaintiff
“need not use formal words of ‘illegality’ or ‘fraud,’
but must sufficiently allege activity with a nexus to a
qui tam action, or fraud against the United States
government.” Id. An employee need not have actual
knowledge of the FCA for her actions to be considered
“protected activity” under § 3730(h). If so, only those
with sophisticated legal knowledge would be protected by
the statute. United States ex rel. Yesudian v. Howard
Univ., 332 U.S. App. D.C. 56, 153 F.3d 731, 741 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) (“. . . only [lawyers] would know from the
outset that what they were investigating could lead to a
False Claims Act prosecution.”).
There is both a subjective and an objective component
for assessing whether an activity is protected conduct
under the FCA, i.e., the relevant inquiry is whether
“(1) the employee in good faith believes, and (2) a
reasonable employee in the same or similar circumstances
might believe, that the employer is committing fraud
against the government.” Moore v. Cal. Inst. of Tech.
Jet Propulsion Lab., 275 F.3d 838, 845 (9th Cir. 2002)).
Employers have tried to apply an onerous standard of
objective reasonableness under which the plaintiff must
demonstrate that her disclosures would have resulted in
a successful qui tam action. See, e.g., Dookeran v.
Mercy Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 281 F.3d 105, 109 (3d Cir.
2002) (plaintiff’s disclosure about false information in
application to be designated clinical study research
center is not protected because application was not
claim for payment). Requiring a § 3730(h) plaintiff to
prove that she disclosed actual violations of the FCA,
however, is contrary to the plain meaning of § 3730(h)
and well-established precedent. The Supreme Court has
specifically noted that “proving a violation of § 3729
is not an element of a § 3730(h) cause of action.”
Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S. ex
rel. Wilson, 545 U.S. 409, 416 n.1 (2005) (citing
Yesudian, 153 F.3d at 740). FCA litigation is a
“distinct possibility” if plaintiff had a “good faith”
belief, based on information he had “at the time of the
retaliation,” he could reasonably conclude that “there
was a ‘distinct possibility’ [the plaintiff] would find
evidence” showing the defendant had submitted false
claims. See Eberhardt v. Integrated Design & Constr.,
Inc., 167 F.3d 861, 869 (4th Cir. 1999). As the D.C.
Circuit held in a leading case construing the scope of §
3730(h) protected conduct, Congress’s “inclusion of an
‘investigation for . . . an action filed or to be filed’
within its protective cover . . . manifests Congress’
intent to protect employees while they are collecting
information about a possible fraud, before they have put
all the pieces of the puzzle together.” Yesudian, 153
F.3d at 740 (emphasis added). This apt metaphor (putting
all the pieces of the puzzle together) should guide
discovery, i.e., plaintiff should take discovery not
only about the pieces of the puzzle that he gathered at
the time he engage in protected conduct, but also the
pieces of the puzzle that plaintiff was not aware of or
had not put together at the time he blew the whistle.
Taking broad discovery about the plaintiff’s protected
conduct is important to demonstrate the objective
reasonableness of plaintiff’s disclosures, and also show
the employer’s motive to retaliate against plaintiff.
Discovery should be also be guided by the Eleventh
Circuit’s standard for assessing protected conduct:
If an employee’s actions, as alleged in the complaint,
are sufficient to support a reasonable conclusion that
the employer could have feared being reported to the
government for fraud or sued in a qui tam action by the
employee, then the complaint states a claim for
retaliatory discharge under § 3730(h).
United States v. Lymphatx, Inc., 2010 WL 547499, at *2
(11th Cir. Feb. 18, 2010) (citation omitted) (emphasis
added). In Lymphatx, the court concluded that the
plaintiff has sufficiently alleged an FCA retaliation
action by averring that “she complained about the
defendants’ ‘unlawful actions’ and warn[ing] them that
they were incurring ‘significant criminal and civil
liability,’” which if proven suffices to show that the
defendants were aware of the possibility of qui tam
litigation. Id. Lymphatx underscores the importance of
taking broad discovery about the employer’s knowledge of
and reaction to plaintiff’s disclosures, including an
investigation of those disclosures.
As employers vigorously try to narrow the scope of
protected conduct, it is important to focus on the
purpose of § 3730(h). The Senate report accompanying the
1986 amendments to the FCA states that Congress added a
retaliation provision to the FCA “to halt companies . .
. from using the threat of economic retaliation to
silence ‘whistleblowers’” and to “assure those who may
be considering exposing fraud that they are legally
protected from retaliatory acts.” S. Rep. No. 99-345, at
34 (1986), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1986, at 5266,
5299. In addition, the legislative history expressly
states that courts should interpret “[p]rotected
activity . . . broadly,” and protected conduct “includes
any ‘good faith’ exercise of an individual ‘on behalf of
himself or other of any option offered by this Act,
including … an action filed or to be filed under this
act.’” Id. at 34-35 (emphasis added).
C. Scope of Actionable Adverse Actions
Section 3730(h) of the FCA prohibits any action which
has a negative effect on the terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, including termination,
demotion, suspension, harassment and any other act that
would dissuade a reasonable person from reporting
violations of the FCA. See, e.g., McKenzie, 123 F.3d at
943-44 (observing that purpose of § 3730(h) is to
prevent any retaliation which would prevent
whistleblower from coming forward). Acts which
constitute actionable retaliation under Title VII are
generally actionable under the FCA. See Moore, 275 F.3d
at 847. This includes oral or written reprimands,
reassignment of duties, as well as other actions that
“might well have dissuaded a reasonable person from
making or supporting a claim” or otherwise engaging in
protected conduct. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co.
v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006). For example, courts
have construed § 3730(h) to protect individuals who are
constructively discharged. See Neal v. Honeywell, Inc.,
191 F.3d 827, 831 (7th Cir. 1999), aff’g, 995 F. Supp.
889 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (concluding that “a drastic
diminution of duties might suffice as a ‘constructive
discharge.’”).
D. Burden of Proof to Prevail in an FCA Retaliation Case
under 3730(h)
To prevail in an FCA retaliation claim, a plaintiff must
show that “the retaliation was motivated at least in
part by the employee’s engaging in protected activity.”
S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 35, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 5300. See also Kakeh v. United Planning Org., Inc.,
655 F. Supp. 2d 107, 119 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that “a
reasonable juror could easily conclude that the short
duration-one day—between the OIG visit to Defendant
office and Plaintiff termination demonstrates that
Defendant knew of Plaintiff protected activity and that
the termination was motivated by a desire to retaliate
against him”). A § 3730(h) plaintiff need not prove “but
for” causation. Id. at 125 n.13 (distinguishing Gross v.
FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2009)).
E. Statute of Limitations and Forum
Prior to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, the statute
of limitations for an FCA retaliation claim was the
analogous state statute of limitations for wrongful
discharge actions, which can range from as little as
three months to three years. See Graham County Soil, 545
U.S. at 418. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the statute of
limitations for FCA retaliation claims is now three
years from the date on which the retaliation occurred.
Dodd-Frank Act § 1079B(c)(2); 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(3).
FCA retaliation claims can be brought directly in
federal court; there is no administrative exhaustion
requirement. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(2).
F. Remedies
A prevailing whistleblower is entitled to “all relief
necessary to make that employee, contractor, or agent
whole,” which includes reinstatement, double back pay,
interest on the back pay, special damages, and
attorney’s fees and costs. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(2).
Where reinstatement is not feasible, front pay is
available. See Wilkins v. St. Louis Housing Authority,
314 F.3d 927, 934 (8th Cir. 2002). The term “special
damages” has been construed to include damages for
emotional distress and other non-economic harm resulting
from retaliation. See Neal, 191 F.3d at 832 (awarding
damages for emotional distress where manager threatened
to physically injure whistleblower).
G. State False Claims Acts
Approximately 28 states and the District of Columbia
have enacted false claims act statutes containing a qui
tam provision, 27 of which contain an anti-retaliation
provision. There is little case law interpreting state
FCA retaliation provisions; therefore, judicial
interpretations of § 3730(h) will likely shape
construction of the retaliation provision of state false
claims act statutes.
THE AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT, PUB. L. NO.
111-5, § 1553, 123 Stat. 115, 297-302 (2009)
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (“ARRA”),
also known as the “Economic Stimulus Bill,” authorized
nearly $800 billion in federal spending to stimulate the
economy and create jobs. To safeguard these funds, ARRA
includes robust whistleblower protections to ensure that
employees of private contractors and state and local
governments can disclose gross mismanagement, waste,
fraud, and abuse of stimulus funds without fear of
reprisal. ARRA, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1553(a), 123 Stat.
115, 297-302 (2009). In particular, § 1553 of ARRA
prohibits any private employer or state or local
government that receives stimulus funds from retaliating
against an employee who discloses information that the
employee reasonably believes constitutes evidence of an
improper use of stimulus funds, including gross
mismanagement of an agency contract or grant. Id. There
is no statute of limitations governing this
whistleblower provision, which means that an employee
may bring a whistleblower retaliation claim against her
employer several years after the employer received the
stimulus funds. See § 1553.
A. Scope of Coverage
Section 1553 applies to “any non-federal employer
receiving covered funds,” including private contractors,
state and local governments and other non-federal
employers that receive a contract, grant or other
payment appropriated or made available by covered funds.
See § 1553(a). It covers not only employees of companies
that have obtained contracts for stimulus projects, but
also to employees of companies that receive any payment
made available by stimulus funds.
B. Protected Conduct
Under ARRA, protected conduct includes a disclosure to a
person with supervisory authority over the employee, a
state or federal regulatory or law enforcement agency, a
member of Congress, a court or grand jury, the head of a
federal agency, or an inspector general about
information that the employee reasonably believes
evidences:
• Gross mismanagement of an agency contract or grant
relating to stimulus funds;
• A gross waste of stimulus funds;
• A substantial and specific danger to public health or
safety related to the implementation or use of stimulus
funds;
• An abuse of authority related to the implementation or
use of stimulus funds; or
• A violation of a law, rule, or regulation that governs
an agency contract or grant related to stimulus funds.
Id. Section 1553 expressly protects “duty speech”
whistleblowing, i.e., disclosures made in the ordinary
course of performing one’s job duties can constitute
protected conduct.
C. Burden of Proof
To prevail on a § 1553 whistleblower claim, an employee
need only demonstrate that the protected conduct was a
contributing factor in the employer’s decision to take
an adverse action. Under this standard, employees need
not prove that their whistleblower complaint was the
sole factor or the determinative factor leading to the
adverse action. Additionally, § 1553 specifically
clarifies that an employee can satisfy the “contributing
factor” standard through the use of “circumstantial
evidence,” i.e., by showing temporal proximity or by
demonstrating that the decision-maker knew of the
protected disclosure. Once the employee demonstrates by
a preponderance of the evidence that her protected
conduct was a contributing factor in the retaliatory
action, the employer can avoid liability only by proving
by clear and convincing evidence that it would have
taken the same adverse action in the absence of the
employee’s protected conduct.
D. Administrative Exhaustion Requirement and Right to
Jury Trial
Actions brought under the whistleblower provisions of §
1553 must be filed initially with the appropriate
inspector general. Unless the inspector general
determines that the action is frivolous, does not relate
to covered funds, or has been resolved in another
federal or state administrative proceeding, the
inspector general must conduct an investigation and make
a determination on the merits of the whistleblower
retaliation claim no later than 180 days after receipt
of the complaint. Within 30 days of receiving an
inspector general’s investigative findings, the head of
the agency must determine whether there has been a
violation, in which event the agency head can award a
complainant reinstatement, back pay, compensatory
damages, and attorney fees. Where an agency has denied
relief in whole or in part or has failed to issue a
decision within 210 days of the filing of a § 1553
complaint, the plaintiff can remove the action to
federal court and is entitled to trial by jury.
Pre-dispute arbitration agreements do not apply to §
1553 claims.
E. Remedies
Under § 1553, a prevailing employee is entitled to “make
whole” relief, which includes reinstatement, back pay,
compensatory damages, and attorney’s fees and litigation
costs. Where an agency files an action in federal court
to enforce an order of relief for a prevailing employee,
the court may award exemplary damages.
ADDITIONAL CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEE PROTECTIONS
There are two fairly obscure anti-retaliation provisions
that prohibit retaliation against employees of
government contactors yet provide robust remedies,
including reinstatement. See 10 U.S.C. § 2409; 41 U.S.C.
§ 265. Both of these statutes require agency Inspector
Generals to investigate claims of retaliation.
Provisions protecting employees of Department of Defense
(“DoD”) contractors authorize employees to pursue a
private right of action in federal court and expressly
provide for trial by jury.
A. U.S.C. § 2409(a)
1. Scope of Coverage
The term “contractor” is defined broadly within the
statute to mean any person who is awarded a contract or
a grant with an agency, including the DoD, the Army, the
Navy, the Air Force, the Coast Guard and the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration. See 10 U.S.C. §
2409(e)(4); see also 10 U.S.C. § 2303(a).
2. Protected Conduct
Protected conduct includes a disclosure to a Member of
Congress, an Inspector General, the Government
Accountability Office, a DoD employee, or an authorized
official of the Department of Justice that the
contractor reasonably believes evidences:
• a gross mismanagement of a DoD contractor grant;
• a gross waste of DoD funds;
• a substantial and specific danger to public health or
safety; or
• a violation of law related to a DoD contract or grant.
10 U.S.C. § 2409(a).
3. Procedure and Remedies
A § 2409 Action must be filed with the DoD Inspector
General and there is no statute of limitations for
filing a complaint. Unless the IG finds that the
complaint is frivolous, the IG must conduct an
investigation and make a determination on the merits no
later than 180 days after receipt of the complaint.
Within 30 days of receiving an inspector general’s
investigative findings, the head of the agency must
determine whether there has been a violation, in which
event the agency head can award a complainant
reinstatement, back pay, employment benefits, exemplary
damages, and attorney fees and expenses. If the agency
denies relief or fails to issue a decision within 210
days of the filing of the complaint, the complainant can
remove the complaint to federal court and elect a jury
trial.
B. Federal Acquisitions Streamlining Act, 41 U.S.C. §
265
The Federal Acquisitions Streamlining Act, 41 U.S.C. §
265, protects employees of contractors of agencies other
than the DoD who suffer reprisal for “disclosing to a
Member of Congress or an authorized official of an
executive agency or the Department of Justice
information relating to a substantial violation of law
related to a contract (including the competition for or
negotiation of a contract).” 41 U.S.C. § 265(a). Unlike
10 U.S.C. § 2409 however, there is no private right of
action under 41 U.S.C. § 265. If an Inspector General
does not recommend that the agency grant relief
(reinstatement, back pay and attorney fees), the
contractor cannot further prosecute the action.
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT, 18 U.S.C. § 1514(A)
In the wake of several corporate fraud scandals in the
early 2000s, including the collapse of Enron, Congress
enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”), also
known as the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability
Act.[2] Section 806 provides a robust private right of
action for retaliation, including preliminary
reinstatement for employees who prevail at the
investigative stage of the action. Recently, OSHA has
issued some very favorable orders for SOX complainants,
including a March 3, 2010 order requiring e-Smart
Technologies to reinstate the complainant and pay over
$600,000 in damages, and a March 18, 2010 order
requiring Tennessee Commerce Bank to pay more than
$1,000,000 in damages and reinstate the Bank’s former
chief financial officer. To prevail in a SOX
whistleblower action, an employee must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that: (1) she engaged in
protected activity; (2) the employer knew that she
engaged in the protected activity; (3) she suffered an
unfavorable personnel action; and (4) the protected
activity was a contributing factor in the unfavorable
action. Allen v. Admin. Review Bd., 514 F.3d 468, 475
(5th Cir. 2008).
A. Scope of Coverage
Section 806 of SOX applies to any “officer, employee,
contractor, subcontractor or agency” of a company that
has securities registered under § 12 of the Securities
Exchange Act or is required to file reports under
section 15(d) of the same Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514(A).
SOX also applies to employees of “any subsidiary whose
financial information is included in the consolidated
financial statements of such company” and employees of
nationally recognized statistical rating organizations.
See Dodd-Frank §§ 922, 929A.[3]
B. Protected Conduct
SOX protects an employee who provides information,
causes information to be provided, or otherwise assists
in an investigation regarding any conduct which the
employee reasonably believes constitutes mail fraud,
wire fraud, bank fraud, or securities fraud, or a
violation of any rule or regulation of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) or any provision of
Federal law relating to fraud against shareholders.
Internal reporting is protected, including a disclosure
to a supervisor. 18 U.S.C. § 1514(A). Indeed, merely
requesting that a company investigate potential
shareholder fraud constitutes protected conduct. Van
Asdale v. Int’l Game Tech, 577 F.3d 989, 997 (9th Cir.
2009).
Protected conduct is not limited to disclosures about
shareholder fraud and instead includes a disclosure
about a violation of any SEC rule or regulation. 18
U.S.C. § 1514(A). For example, a disclosure about
deficient internal accounting controls[4] or
non-compliance with Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles is protected. See Smith v. Corning Inc., 496
F. Supp. 2d 244 (W.D.N.Y. 2007); Welch v. Chao, 536 F.3d
269 (4th Cir. 2008). There is, however, an important
limitation on SOX protected conduct that both the DOL
Administrative Review Board (“ARB”)[5]and federal
appeals courts have read into SOX. The complainant’s
communications must “definitively and specifically”
relate to any of the listed categories of fraud or
securities violations under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(a)(1).
See Platone v. FLYi, Inc., ARB No. 04-154, slip op. at
17 (Sept. 29, 2006); Allen, 514 F.3d at 476.
Accordingly, it is critical to plead SOX protected
conduct with specificity, including the link between the
protected disclosure and one of the six categories of
fraud enumerated in Section 806. There are, however, no
“magic words” that an employee must utter to trigger the
protections of Section 806. Van Asdale, 577 F.3d at 997
(employee need not use words “SOX,” “fraud,” “fraud on
shareholders” or “stock fraud” to satisfy the heightened
burden widely adopted by federal courts); Welch, 536
F.3d at 276 (SOX whistleblower “need not ‘cite a code
section he believes was violated’ in his communications
to his employer.”).
C. Reasonable Belief Requirement
A SOX retaliation plaintiff need not demonstrate that
she disclosed an actual violation of securities law;
only that she reasonably believed that her employer was
defrauding shareholders or violating an SEC rule. See
Van Asdale, 577 F.3d at 992. Indeed, a reasonable but
mistaken belief is protected under SOX. See Kalkunte v.
DVI Fin. Servs., ARB Nos. 05-139, 05-140 at 11, ALJ No.
2004-SOX-56 at 11 (ARB Feb. 27, 2009); see also Halloum
v. Intel Corp., 2003-SOX-7 at 10 (ALJ Mar. 4, 2004),
aff’d (ARB Jan. 31, 2006) (“belief that an activity was
illegal may be reasonable even when subsequent
investigation proves a complainant was entirely wrong .
. . .”).
An employee’s reasonable belief must be scrutinized
under both a subjective and objective standard. Welch,
536 F.3d at 275. The objective reasonableness of a
complainant’s belief is evaluated based on “the
knowledge available to a reasonable person in the same
factual circumstances, with the same training and
experience as the aggrieved employee.” In Allen, the
court held that a certified public accountant (CPA) did
not engage in protected conduct when she complained
about her employer overstating gross profits in
violation of SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin 101
(“SAB-101”). The Allen Court held that this disclosure
was not protected because the whistleblower identified
improper accounting practices in accounting reports that
had not yet been filed with the SEC and a CPA should
know that SAB-101 applies only financial reports that
have been filed with the SEC. The implication of this
flawed decision is that a whistleblower should allow the
violation to occur before reporting it, thereby ensuring
that the whistleblower is disclosing an actual
violation. Adopting this rule would defeat the intent of
SOX, which is to prevent the carrying out of the
underlying crime. See Getman v. Southwest Secs., Inc.,
2003-SOX-8 at 13 n.8 (ALJ Feb. 2, 2004), reversed on
other grounds, ARB No. 04-059 (ARB July 29, 2005). Judge
Levin pointed out in Morefield v. Exelon Servs., Inc.,
2004-SOX-2 at 5 (ALJ Jan. 28, 2004):
The value of the whistleblower resides in his or her
insider status. . . . [T]heir reasonable concerns may,
for example, address the inadequacy of internal controls
promulgated in compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley mandates
or SEC rules that impact on procedures throughout the
organization, or the application of accounting
principles, or the exposure of incipient problems which,
if left unattended, could mature into violations of
rules or regulations of the type an audit committee
would hope to forestall.
Moreover, requiring a SOX complainant to demonstrate
that she disclosed an actual violation is contrary to
Congressional intent in that the legislative history of
§ 806 specifically states that the reasonableness test
“is intended to include all good faith and reasonable
reporting of fraud, and there should be no presumption
that reporting is otherwise, absent specific evidence.”
Legislative History of Title VIII of HR 2673: The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Cong. Rec. S7418, S7420
(daily ed. July 26, 2002), available at 2002 WL 32054527
(citing Passaic Valley Sewerage Commissioners v. DOL,
992 F.2d 474, 478 (3d Cir. 1993) (setting forth broad
definition of “good faith” protected disclosures under
analogous whistleblower protection statutes)). In sum,
limiting protected conduct to disclosures of actual
violations of SEC rules is contrary to the plain meaning
and intent of SOX. A SOX plaintiff, however, must
prepare at the outset of the case to meet a high
standard of objective reasonableness. For example, the
complaint should plead how the plaintiff’s disclosures
implicate violations of specific SEC rules or fraud
statutes.
D. Scope of Actionable Adverse Actions
Under § 806, the scope of actionable adverse actions is
broad and includes discharging, demoting, suspending,
threatening, harassing or discriminating against an
employee who engages in protected conduct. § 1514A(a).
The ARB and federal courts have held that the Burlington
Northern[6] standard applies to SOX whistleblower
claims. Melton v. Yellow Transp. Inc., ARB No. 06-052,
05-140, ALJ No. 2005-STA-002 (ARB Sept. 30, 2008);
Schlicksup v. Caterpillar, Inc., No. 09-CV-1208, 2010 WL
2774480 at *3 (C.D. Ill. July 13, 2010). Under this
broad standard, an employment action is adverse if it
would dissuade a reasonable person from engaging in the
protected conduct.
E. Burden of Proof
A SOX complainant need not prove that her protected
conduct was the motivating or determining factor in the
employer’s adverse action but instead need only prove
that the protected conduct was a “contributing factor.”
The DOL’s ARB defines a contributing factor as “any
factor, which alone or in combination with other
factors, tends to affect in any way the outcome of the
decision.” Allen v. Stewart Enterprises, Inc., ARB No.
06-081, slip op. at 17 (July 27, 2006). This standard is
“intended to overrule existing case law, which requires
a whistleblower to prove that her protected conduct was
a “significant,” “motivating,” substantial.” or
“predominant” factor in a personnel action in order to
overturn that action.” Id. Once an employee satisfies
this minimal causation standard by a preponderance of
the evidence, an employer can avoid liability only where
it proves by “clear and convincing evidence” that it
would have taken the same action absent the employee’s
protected conduct. See Kalkunte, ARB Nos. 05-139, 05-140
at 13.
F. Statute of Limitations and Forum
A SOX whistleblower must file a complaint with
Department of Labor (“DOL”) within 180 days of the date
that she becomes aware of the violation. See §
1514A(b)(2)(D) (as amended by the Dodd-Frank Act §
922(c)(1)(A)(i)-(ii)). A SOX plaintiff must exhaust
administrative remedies prior to litigating, i.e., a SOX
plaintiff must file her complaint with DOL’s
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”).
If while the claim is before OSHA, new adverse actions
take place, an employee must amend her complaint to
include the subsequent adverse employment actions. See,
e.g., Willis v. Vie Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 04-435, 2004 WL
1774575 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (dismissing complaint for
termination in violation of SOX because it was never
presented to DOL). After OSHA performs an investigation,
either party can request a hearing before a DOL ALJ and
can appeal an ALJ decision to the DOL’s Administrative
Review Board. If DOL has not issued a final decision
within 180 days of the filing of the complaint, the
employee may remove the complaint to federal court for a
jury trial. See § 1514A(b)(1)(B)-(E) (as amended by the
Dodd-Frank Act § 922(c)(1); Stone v. Instrumentation
Lab. Co., 591 F.3d 239, 245 (4th Cir. 2009).
G. Remedies
A prevailing employee under the SOX retaliation
provision is entitled to “all relief necessary to make
the employee whole,” including reinstatement, back pay,
attorney’s fees and costs. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c). An
employee can also obtain special damages under SOX,
which includes damages for impairment of reputation,
personal humiliation, mental anguish and suffering, and
other non-economic harm resulting from retaliation. See
Kalkunte, ARB Nos. 05-139, 05-140 (clarifying that
“special damages” under SOX includes compensatory
damages; upholding ALJ’s award of damages for pain,
suffering, mental anguish, humiliation, and effect on
complainant’s credit). If OSHA finds for the employee
and the employer appeals, OSHA’s preliminary order of
relief is stayed, except reinstatement.
THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY IMPROVEMENT ACT, 15 U.S.C. §
2087
In response to startling instances of consumers being
exposed to dangerous products, such as children exposed
to toys with lead paint, Congress enacted an overhaul of
consumer protections in the Consumer Product Safety
Improvement Act (“CPSIA”), 15 U.S.C. § 2087. The CPSIA
includes a robust whistleblower anti-retaliation
provision that prohibits manufacturers, private
labelers, distributors, and retailers from retaliation
against an employee because the employee blew the
whistle about a perceived violation of the CPSIA.
Similar to a SOX complainant, a CPSIA whistleblower
retaliation plaintiff must prove that: (1) she engaged
in protected conduct; (2) the employer knew that she
engaged in protected conduct; (2) the employer took
adverse action against her; and (4) the protected
conduct contributed to the employer’s decision to take
an adverse action. § 2087(b).
The whistleblower provision of the CPSIA protects an
employee whose employer discharges or discriminates
against her because the employee: (1) provides
information relating to a violation of the CPSIA or any
act enforced by the Consumer Product Safety Commission
(“Commission”) to their employer, the federal
government, or state attorneys general; (2) testifies or
assists in a proceeding concerning a violation of the
CPSIA or any act enforced by the Commission; or (3)
refuses to participate in an activity, policy, practice,
or assigned task that the employee reasonably believes
violates the CPSIA or any act enforced by the
Commission. § 2087(a)(1)-(4). Specific examples of
protected conduct include:
1. Reporting violations of the standard for the
flammability of children’s sleepwear;
2. Disclosing information about the use of consumer
patching compounds containing free-form asbestos;
3. Reporting an employer’s violation of a safety
standard for creating architectural glazing materials;
4. Reporting choking incidents involving marbles, small
balls, latex balloons and other small parts;
5. Reporting the export of banned or misbranded
products;
6. Disclosing information about an employer’s import or
distribution of new all-terrain vehicles in violation of
the CPSIA; and
7. Providing information about an employer who
manufactures a toy that contains an unsafe amount of
lead.
The burden of proof, scope of actionable adverse
actions, and procedural rules are similar to those in
SOX. See § 2087(b)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). The major difference
is that an employee bringing a claim under the CPSIA
must wait 210 days for DOL to issue a final decision
before removing the complaint to federal court for a
jury trial. See § 2087(b)(4)(A). SOX plaintiffs need
only wait 180 days to receive a final decision from DOL
before removal.
WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION FOR EMPLOYEES IN THE FINANCIAL
SERVICES INDUSTRY
The Dodd-Frank Act creates a robust retaliation action
for employees in the financial services industry.[7] See
Dodd-Frank Act § 1057. The scope of coverage is quite
broad in that Section 1057 applies to organizations that
extend credit or service or broker loans; provide real
estate settlement services or perform property
appraisals; provide financial advisory services to
consumers relating to proprietary financial products,
including credit counseling; or collect, analyze,
maintain, or provide consumer report information or
other account information in connection with any
decision regarding the offering or provision of a
consumer financial product or service.
Protected conduct includes providing to the Bureau of
Consumer Financial Protection (“Bureau”) or any other
government or law enforcement agency information that
the employee reasonably believes relates to any
violation of the consumer financial protection provision
of the Dodd-Frank Act (Title X), or any rule, order,
standard, or prohibition prescribed or enforced by the
Bureau. Employees are also protected if they initiate or
cause to be initiated any proceeding under federal
consumer financial law or if they object to or refuse to
participate in any activity, practice, or assigned task
that the employee reasonably believes to be a violation
of any law, rule, standard, or prohibition subject to
the jurisdiction of the Bureau.
The procedures, remedies, and burden of proof are
identical to the CPSIA, i.e., the complaint must be
filed initially with OSHA. However, if the DOL does not
issue a final order within 210 days (or within 90 days
of receiving a written determination) the case may be
removed to federal court and either party may request a
jury trial. See Dodd-Frank Act § 1057(c)(1)(A) to
(c)(5)(D); 15 U.S.C. § 2087(b)(1) to (c). A complainant
can prevail merely by showing by a preponderance of the
evidence that her protected activity was a contributing
factor in the employer’s decision to take an adverse
employment action. Remedies include reinstatement,
backpay, compensatory damages, and attorney’s fees and
litigation costs, including expert witness fees.
REWARDS AND PROTECTIONS FOR SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION AND COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
WHISTLEBLOWERS
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, an individual who provides
original information to the SEC or Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (“CFTC”) which results in monetary
sanctions exceeding $1 million shall be paid an award of
10 to 30 percent of the amount recouped. See Dodd-Frank
Act § 748 (applying to CFTC whistleblowers) and § 922(a)
(applying to SEC whistleblowers). The amount of the
reward is at the discretion of the respective commission
and factors to be considered in calculating the amount
of the award include the significance of the information
provided by the whistleblower, the degree of assistance
provided by the whistleblower, the interest of the
respective commission in deterring violations by making
awards to whistleblowers, and other factors that the
each commission may establish by rule or regulation. Id.
An award shall not be paid to a whistleblower who has
been convicted of a criminal violation related to the
judicial or administrative action for which the
whistleblower provided information; who gains the
information by auditing financial statements as required
under the securities laws; who fails to submit
information to the SEC as required by an SEC rule; or
who is an employee of the DOJ or an appropriate
regulatory agency, a self-regulatory organization, the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board or a law
enforcement organization. Id. Sections 748 and 922 of
Dodd-Frank are not qui tam provisions, i.e., the
whistleblower cannot pursue an action if the SEC or CFTC
decline to act on the whistleblower’s disclosure.
A. SEC Whistleblower Protection Provision
Section 922(a) protects employees who have suffered
retaliation “because of any lawful act done by the
whistleblower—‘(i) in providing information to the
Commission in accordance with [the whistleblower reward
subsection]; (ii) in initiating, testifying in, or
assisting in any investigation or judicial or
administrative action of the Commission based upon or
related to such information; or (iii) in making
disclosures that are required or protected under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act,’” the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, and “‘any other law, rule, or regulation subject
to the jurisdiction of the [SEC].’”
The action may be brought directly in federal court and
remedies include reinstatement, double back pay with
interest, as well as litigation costs, expert witness
fees, and reasonable attorney’s fees. The claim must be
brought within three years from the date when the facts
material to the right of action are known or reasonably
should have been known to the whistleblower, but no more
than six years after the violation occurred. Id.
B. CFTC Whistleblower Protection Provision
Section 748 contains a whistleblower protection
provision that is substantially similar to § 922(a).
Protected conduct includes providing information to the
CFTC in accordance with the whistleblower incentive
program or assisting “in any investigation or judicial
or administrative action of the [CFTC] based upon or
related to such information.” Id. The statute of
limitations is two years from the date of the violation.
Id.
PROTECTION FOR HEALTH CARE WHISTLEBLOWERS
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2009
(“PPACA”) which became law on March 23, 2010, amended
the definition of an “original source” under the FCA and
created new protections for employees who blow the
whistle about violations of Title I of the PPACA.[8] See
PPACA §§ 1558, 10104(j)(2). Under § 1558, an employee
engages in protected conduct when he provides or is
about to provide to an employer, the Federal Government,
or a state attorney general, information that the
employee reasonably believes to be a violation of Title
I of the PPACA. Section 1558 also protects employees who
participate in an investigation, or object to or refuse
to participate in any activity that the employee
reasonably believes to constitute a violation of Title
I. Title I covers a broad range of rules governing
health insurance including policy and financial
reporting requirements and prohibitions against
discrimination. Title I also mandates that hospitals
establish and publish a list of standard charges, and
prescribes rules for insurers to submit reinsurance
claims to the Secretary under a program for early
retirees. See PPACA §§ 1001, 1102(c).
Section 1558 incorporates the procedures,
burden-shifting framework, remedies, and statute of
limitation set forth in the CPSIA, 15 U.S.C. 2087(b).[9]
See PPACA § 1558.
COMMON LAW WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
In addition to the relief available under Federal
whistleblower laws, employees may have a common law
claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy. This can be the best remedy for whistleblowers
because employees can seek punitive damages in wrongful
discharge cases.[10]
Approximately 46 states have adopted a public policy
exception to the employment at will rule. The elements
for establishing a whistleblowing-based wrongful
discharge claim, however, vary considerably from state
to state. For example, some state courts have held that
a statutory expression of public policy is required.
See, e.g., Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 688 (Cal.
1992); Campbell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 413 N.E.2d 1054,
1059 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). Other state courts, however,
have held that administrative regulations, federal
statutes, and case law can also define the public policy
at issue. See, e.g., Lewis v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
No. 3:02CV512 (RNC) 2003 WL 1746050 (D. Conn. 2003)
(denying motion to dismiss claim by in-house insurance
defense counsel who alleged that he had been discharged
in violation of public policy expressed by Connecticut
Rules of Professional Conduct relating to duty of
loyalty owed to insureds); see also Hubbard v. Spokane
County, 50 P.3d 602, 606 (Wash. 2002) (en banc)
(Washington Supreme Court recognized county zoning code
and state statute as source of public policy to support
claim by county planning director who alleged that he
had been discharged for questioning legality of issuing
hotel building permit).
States also differ on the types of legal violations that
can support a wrongful discharge claim. In Virginia, for
example, only state statutes constitute public policy.
An employee discharged in retaliation for reporting
wrongdoing that violates federal law cannot make a
wrongful discharge claim in Virginia. Other states such
as Maryland, take a broader approach and protect
employees who report a violation of any state or federal
statute. While courts do not uniformly interpret the
types of protected activity that give rise to a tort
claim for wrongful discharge, most courts have
recognized a claim for the following types of protected
activity: (1) refusing to engage in illegal activity,
(2) performing a duty required by law, or (3) exercising
a statutory right.
A. Refusing to Engage in Illegal Activity
The tort for wrongful discharge protects employees from
being terminated because they refuse to engage in
illegal activity. For example, courts will likely
recognize a wrongful discharge claim where an employee
is terminated for refusing to participate in an
employer’s irregular accounting practices, including the
recording of an asset purchased by one entity and
placing it on the books of another entity. See Rocky
Mountain Hosp. & Medi. Serv. v. Mariani, 916 P.2d 519,
527 (Colo. 1996) (recognizing wrongful discharge claim
where company recorded assets purchased by one entity
under books of another entity). Cases construing this
form of protected conduct include:
• Recognizing a wrongful discharge claim where an
employee was terminated for refusing to participate in
employer-directed activities that he claimed violated
both state and federal criminal statutes. See, e.g.,
Isbell v. Stewart & Stevenson, Ltd., 9 F. Supp. 2d 731,
732 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
• Recognizing a wrongful discharge claim where an
employee was discharged for refusing to violate federal
and state tax laws regarding deductions for employees’
wages and bonuses. See, e.g., Strozinsky v. Sch. Dist.
of Brown Deer, 614 N.W.2d 443, 459 (Wis. 2000).
• Recognizing a wrongful discharge claim where an
employee refused to commit perjury on behalf of his
supervisor. See, e.g., Ne. Health Mgmt., Inc. v. Cotton,
56 S.W.3d 440, 447 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001).
B. Fulfilling a Statutory Obligation
An at-will employee who is terminated for fulfilling a
statutory obligation or reporting suspected criminal
behavior to law enforcement is protected under public
policy. Under this form of protected conduct, the
employee must demonstrate that she had a legal
obligation or duty to report the employer’s unlawful
conduct. Thus, an employee terminated for blowing the
whistle on her co-worker who distributed prescription
medication to patients without authorization from a
physician, but who had no statutory duty to report the
misconduct, will likely have her claim dismissed. See
Austin v. HealthTrust, Inc., 967 S.W. 2d 400 (Tex. 1998)
(declining to extend public policy tort doctrine to
protect private whistleblower who reported another nurse
for working while under the influence and distributing
prescription medication to patients without
authorization from a physician because the employee was
under no duty to oppose such illegal conduct).
C. Exercising a Statutory Right or Privilege
Terminating an employee for exercising her statutory
rights can give rise to a wrongful discharge claim.
Uylaki v. Town of Griffith, 878 N.E. 2d 412, 414 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2007) (holding that employee who has been fired
for exercising statutory right or refusing to violate
law has claim for wrongful discharge). In Jackson v.
Morris Commc’ns Corp., for example, a Nebraska court
recognized a cause of action for wrongful discharge
where a co-circulation manager for the York News-Times
alleged that “she was discharged in retaliation for
filing a [workers’ compensation] claim.” Jackson, 657
N.W.2d 634, 641 (Neb. 2003). In reaching its decision,
the court reasoned that the “failure to recognize the
cause of action for retaliatory discharge for filing a
workmen’s compensation claim would only undermine [the]
Act and the strong public policy behind its enactment.”
Id. at 641 (citing Hansen v. Harrah’s, 675 P.2d 394
(Nev. 1984)). A California court reiterated this
principle in Grant-Burton v. Covenant Care, Inc., when
it recognized a wrongful discharge claim for an employee
who was terminated for participating in a group
discussion with other employees about the fairness of
the employer’s bonus system, a statutory right available
to employees under section 232 the California Labor
Code. See Grant-Burton, 99 Cal. App. 4th 1361, 1371
(2002). Covenant Care argued that section 232 was not
triggered because the marketing directors did not
disclose the amount of their bonuses. The court,
however, rejected Covenant’s argument, stating that the
amount of wages can be disclosed without mentioning
dollars and cents and concluded that the company
wrongfully discharged the marketing director for
exercising her statutory right to discuss compensation
with her co-workers. Other examples of rights that have
been recognized as the basis of a violation include:
• Terminating a barmaid for exercising her right to
participate in benefits of the Unemployment Compensation
Fund. See, e.g., Smith v. Troy Moose Lodge No. 1044, 645
N.E. 2d 1352, 1353 (Ohio 1994).
• Terminating an employee because he protested his
employer’s unauthorized use of his name in its lobbying
efforts. See, e.g., Chavez v. Manville Prods. Corp., 777
P. 2d 371, 376 (N.M. 1989).
• Discharging an employee for refusing to submit to a
drug test in violation of Cal. Const. Art. 1, § 1. See,
e.g., Semore v. Pool, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1087, 1098
(1990).
• Discharging an employee for exercising his statutory
right to overtime pay. See, e.g., Meyers v. Meyers, 846
N.E.2d 280, 706 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
In sum, “[an] employee must be able to exercise his
[statutory] right in an unfettered fashion without being
subject to reprisal.” Jackson, 657 N.W.2d at 639.
D. Potential Sources of Public Policy
Sources of public policy for a common law wrongful
discharge claim may include clear and particularized
pronouncements of public policy in the United States
Constitution, the State Constitution, and federal and
state statutes and regulations. See, e.g., Island v.
Buena Vista Resort, 103 S.W.3d 671,679 (Ark. 2003)
(sexual harassment statute established public policy
against sexual harassment); Ballinger v. Delaware River
Port Auth., 800 A.2d 97, 108 (N.J. 2002) (sources of
public policy include legislation, administrative rules,
regulations or decisions, and judicial decisions, as
well as professional codes of ethics under certain
circumstances); Tiernan v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr.,
Inc., 575 S.E.2d 618, 622 (W. Va. 2002) (Code of State
Regulations sets forth specific statement of substantial
public policy, ensuring that hospital unit is properly
staffed to accommodate regulation’s directive, that
patients are protected from inadequate staffing
practices, and that medical care is provided to hospital
patients); Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 803 A.2d 482, 490
(Md. 2002) (constitutional provisions and principles
provide clear public policy mandates under which a
termination may be grounds for wrongful discharge
claim); Mitchem v. Counts, 523 S.E.2d 246, 250 (Va.
2000) (common law cause of action for wrongful
termination could be based on public policies expressed
in statutes prohibiting fornication and lewd and
lascivious behavior); Faulkner v. United Tech. Corp.,
693 A.2d 293, 295 (Conn. 1997) (wrongful discharge claim
may be predicated solely on violation of federal as
opposed to state statute); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale
Mem’l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1033 (Ariz. 1985) (public
policy can be found in expressions of state’s founders
and state’s constitution and statutes that embody the
public conscience of people within that state). Specific
examples of federal statutes that may serve as sources
of public policy include:
• 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which prohibits knowing and willful
falsification, concealment or covering up of “a material
fact, or mak[ing] any false, fictitious, or fraudulent
statement or entry . . . ;”
• 18 U.S.C. § 1002, which prohibits knowingly defrauding
the government;
• 18 U.S.C. § 1031, which criminalizes the knowing
execution of a scheme or artifice to defraud the federal
government;
• 18 U.S.C. § 208, which prohibits employees from
participating in government contracts in which they hold
a financial interest;
• 41 U.S.C. §§ 51-54, which makes it a criminal offense
for any subcontractor to knowingly influence the award
of a subcontract;
• 18 U.S.C. § 1516, which prohibits an intentional
effort to influence, obstruct or impede a federal
auditor;
• 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343, which prohibit mail fraud
and wire fraud, i.e., using wire communications, the
U.S. Postal Service or other interstate delivery
services to accomplish an illegal act; and
• 18 U.S.C. § 287, which criminalizes the knowing
submission of any false claim to the government.
The FCA itself can be a source of public policy in a
wrongful discharge action. For example, a district judge
recently denied a motion to dismiss a Missouri common
law wrongful discharge action in which the plaintiff
alleged he was terminated for disclosing to his
supervisor a billing scheme in which his employer was
spreading the cost of certain projects to other
unrelated projects, thereby causing certain projects to
be falsely over billed. See McNerney v. Lockheed Martin
Ops. Support, Inc., No. 4:10-cv-00704 (W.D.Mo. 10/22/10)
(order denying motion to dismiss). Concluding that the
billing scheme about which plaintiff complained was a
fraudulent attempt to get the Government to pay out
money it was not obligated to pay, the scheme violated
the public policy embodied in the FCA and therefore
terminating the plaintiff for complaining about the
scheme violated Missouri law.
D. Pleading Requirements and Burden of Proof
While there is no heightened pleading requirement for a
wrongful discharge claim, it is critical to plead with
specificity the public policy that the employer violated
by discharging the plaintiff. See, e.g., Lawrence
Chrysler Plymouth Corp. v. Brooks, 465 S.E.2d 806, 808
(Va. 1996) (no cause of action was stated where employee
failed to specify statutory basis for claim that he was
wrongfully discharged for refusing to perform auto
repairs using method that he believed unsafe). Moreover,
an employee should ensure that the specified public
policy applies not only to him but also to the
particular employer. See, e.g., Edmondson v. Shearer
Lumber Prod., 75 P.3d 733 (Idaho 2003) (employee cannot
base wrongful discharge claim against private sector
employer on exercise of constitutional right of free
speech, because this right is protected only against
government action).
To establish a prima facie case in most jurisdictions,
an employee must establish the following:
1. That plaintiff was an at-will employee terminated by
the defendant;
2. That the termination of the plaintiff’s employment
violates a specific public policy; and
3. That there is a causal nexus between the public
policy violation and the employer’s decision to
terminate the plaintiff.
In attempting to establish that the employee’s
termination violates public policy, the employee’s
counsel should always try to emphasize the public and
social importance of the rights or interests that the
employee is attempting to defend. Courts are more apt to
recognize a wrongful discharge claim of an employee
discharged for supplying law enforcement with
information about a co-worker’s involvement in a crime
than for an employee discharged for asserting his right
to take a rest break. Compare Palmateer v. Int’l
Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 846 (Ill. 1981) (employee
stated cause of action for retaliatory discharge where
employee alleged that he was discharged for supplying
law enforcement agency with information that fellow
employee might be involved in violation of criminal
code) and Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc., 362 S.E.2d 915 (Va.
1987) (court characterized employee-shareholder’s
statutory right to vote free from employer’s coercion,
right conferred by policy benefiting public rather than
merely benefiting shareholder’s private interest) with
Crawford Rehab. Serv’s, Inc. v. Weissman, 938 P.2d 540
(Colo. 1997) (plaintiff’s right to take rest breaks
clearly did not implicate substantial public policy);
and City of Virginia Beach v. Harris, 523 S.E.2d 239
(Va. 2000) (police officer terminated for obtaining
warrants against his supervisor did not have claim
against city for wrongful discharge in violation of
public policy based on statute describing powers and
duties of police officer; statute did not state any
public policy and was not designed to protect any public
rights pertaining to property, personal freedoms,
health, safety, or welfare).
Additionally, an employee must identify a public policy
that is expressed in a source acceptable and actionable
within the state governing the action. For example, as
discussed above, some states require that the public
policy be expressed in a state statute, rather than a
federal source. See, e.g., Clinton v. State ex rel.
Logan County Election Bd., 29 P.3d 543 (Okla. 2001)
(plaintiff must identify Oklahoma public policy goal
that is clear and compelling and is articulated in
existing Oklahoma constitutional, statutory, or
jurisprudential law); Torrez v. City of Scottsdale, 13
IER 316 (Ariz. Super. Ct. 1997) (holding that neither
federal statutes nor municipal ordinances are cognizable
sources of public policy). Once the public policy has
been established, the employee must demonstrate that her
conduct furthered that particular public policy. This
may require a showing that the employee took affirmative
steps that required the employer to conform to the
stated public policy.
There are challenges, however, in proving the causal
relationship between the employee’s conduct and the
stated public policy violation. Some issues that arise
in the context of wrongful discharge litigation include:
(1) whether an employee must prove that the employer’s
conduct actually violated public policy or whether it is
sufficient that the employee had a good faith belief
that the employer’s conduct violated public policy; and
(2) whether the employee must demonstrate that she
disclosed information about the employer’s violations of
public policy to regulatory or prosecutorial agencies or
if it is sufficient to make complaints internally. While
most courts have held that employees need not voice
their concerns about their employer’s public policy
violations externally, and that a reasonable belief that
the employer’s conduct violated public policy is
sufficient to make a claim for wrongful discharge,
employees should try to identify evidence that would
show a colorable case of illegality, i.e., information
about a regulatory action taken against the employer for
malfeasance can provide a basis for the employee’s
belief that the employer was engaging in conduct that
violated public policy.
E. Remedies
A prevailing plaintiff can recover backpay, front pay,
damages for emotional distress, and punitive damages. In
certain jurisdictions, punitive damages can be awarded
only upon a showing of malice, which can be inferred
from circumstantial evidence. See Kessler v. Equity
Mgmt., Inc., 572 A.2d 1144, 1151 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1990). Other jurisdictions have awarded punitive damages
where an employer formally requires an employee’s
adherence to the law but simultaneously requests that
the employee engage in unlawful conduct. See Smith v.
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 196 Cal. App. 3d 503
(1987) (awarding punitive damages where liquor distiller
consciously disregarded rights of employees by requiring
that they engage in illegal activities).
F. An Alternative Statutory Remedy May Bar a Common Law
Wrongful Discharge Action
In many states, where the source of public policy is
expressed in a statute with its own remedy to vindicate
the public policy objectives, the employee can pursue a
retaliation action only through the statute. For
example, in Scott v. Topeka Performing Arts Ctr., Inc.,
the court granted the employer’s motion to dismiss,
concluding that the employee’s state-law claim for
retaliatory discharge was precluded by the alternative
statutory remedies available under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (“FLSA”). Scott v. Topeka Performing Arts
Ctr., Inc., 69 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1330 (D. Kan. 1999). In
Scott, the employee alleged that she was wrongfully
discharged for asserting her rights under the FLSA. In
her complaint, the employee argued that it was unclear
whether relief on her FLSA retaliation claim would
include all the remedies available under her state-law
claim and that the remedies under the FLSA were not
adequate. The court rejected this argument, barring the
employee from pursuing a wrongful discharge claim
against her employer. Similarly in Korslund v. Dyncorp
Tri-Cities Serv., Inc., a group of employees was
precluded from pursuing wrongful discharge claims where
the employees alleged that their employer retaliated
against them for reporting safety violations,
mismanagement, and fraud at a nuclear facility. Korslund
125 P.3d 119 (Wash. 2005) (en banc). According to the
Washington court, the administrative process for
whistleblower complaints in the federal Energy
Reorganization Act (“ERA”) adequately protected the
public policy of protecting against waste and fraud in
the nuclear industry. Thus, when attempting to bring a
retaliation claim under the wrongful discharge tort, an
employee should not rely on a statute with its own
whistleblowing remedy as the source of public policy.
The employee should, if possible, identify and cite
another statue that lacks its own remedy.
G. Failure to Exhaust Internal Remedies May Lead to
Early Dismissal
An employee’s claim for wrongful discharge can be
dismissed at the early stages of litigation if the state
or jurisdiction where the tort is being adjudicated
requires that the employee exhaust internal remedies
prior to reporting the employer’s alleged malfeasance to
outside authorities and the employee fails to comply
with the company’s remedial corporate procedures and
policies. For example, a California court affirmed
summary judgment, dismissing an employee’s wrongful
discharge claim where the employee failed to exhaust a
university’s internal grievance procedures. See Palmer
v. Regents of the Univ. of Ca., 132 Cal. Rptr. 567, 571
(2003). According to the court, when a private
association or public entity establishes an internal
grievance mechanism, an employee must exhaust those
internal remedies before pursuing a civil action for
wrongful termination. See id.
H. State Statutory Whistleblower Protections
Nearly all states and the District of Columbia have
adopted statutory whistleblower protections, some of
which protect only public sector employees.[11] The
scope of protected conduct varies widely. Some state
whistleblower statutes protect only disclosures
concerning violation of law, while some also protect
disclosures concerning violations of rules and
regulations. Unlike nearly all of the federal
whistleblower protection statutes, many state
whistleblower protection laws do not protect internal
disclosures. And some afford protection to a
whistleblower only where the whistleblower disclosed the
matter internally prior to reporting it to the
Government. The strongest state whistleblower protection
statute for employees in the private sector is New
Jersey’s Conscientious Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”),
N.J.S.A. § 34:19-5, which protects both private and
public sector employees who disclose or threaten to
disclose internally or to a public body an activity,
policy, or practice that the employee reasonably
believes is in violation of a law, rule, or regulation.
Remedies for a prevailing CEPA plaintiff include
economic damages, emotional distress damages, attorney’s
fees and punitive damages.
In sum, counsel should assess whether a whistleblower
who has suffered retaliation has a remedy under state
law, including a retaliation action under a state FCA,
an action under a state whistleblower protection
statute, and a common law wrongful discharge action.
Trying the case in state court may offer the opportunity
to recover higher damages, and minimizes the risk of
dismissal on a motion summary judgment.
General Tips for Litigating Whistleblower Retaliation
Claims
The proliferation and strengthening of whistleblower
retaliation statutes and the expansion of the common law
wrongful discharge tort have dramatically altered the
options for whistleblowers who have suffered
retaliation. Whereas just a few years ago a
whistleblower may have just one remedy, if any,
whistleblowers now may have several potential claims.
Therefore, it is critical during the intake process to
thoroughly analyze those options. The remainder of the
article provides general tips for maximizing damages,
claim selection, forum selection, pleading whistleblower
retaliation claims, and litigating whistleblower
retaliation claims.
A. Claim Selection
1. Maximizing Damages
In choosing claims, consider options to maximize
damages. For example, including a claim with a
fee-shifting provision is critical. The statutory
whistleblower retaliation claims discussed in this
article all authorize attorney fees and costs for a
prevailing plaintiff. Additionally, statutory
whistleblower retaliation claims generally do not
authorize punitive damages. Consider bringing a common
law claim under state law for wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy or other tort claims that
offer the opportunity to obtain punitive damages.
Potential common law claims include defamation,
promissory estoppel, breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, intentional interference with
contract, and breach of contract. Where an employer’s
conduct is outrageous, a jury may be motivated to award
significant punitive damages.
Another advantage of adding a statutory whistleblower
retaliation claim is the opportunity to obtain
reinstatement. Most of the recently enacted DOL
whistleblower retaliation statutes authorize preliminary
reinstatement, i.e., if OSHA finds for the complainant
at the investigative stage (before the parties have
litigated the case), the employer must reinstate the
employee immediately. Preliminary reinstatement gives a
complainant significant leverage in litigation (the
whistleblower is back at the worksite while prosecuting
his claim) and can lead to a favorable settlement. Under
the leadership of Secretary Chao, OSHA was criticized
for failing to enforce whistleblower protection statutes
and for finding in favor of employers in most
whistleblower retaliation investigations. Plaintiff’s
counsel typically viewed the OSHA investigative stage as
a waste of time for the whistleblower because OSHA
merely adopted the employer’s justification for the
adverse action. The current leadership of OSHA is
undertaking concrete steps to invigorate OSHA’s
Whistleblower Protection Program and OSHA has recently
issued several favorable orders in whistleblower
retaliation cases. Accordingly, plaintiff’s counsel
should not assume that it is best to forego pursuing a
whistleblower retaliation claim with an administrative
exhaustion requirement. To the contrary, pursuing a
strong whistleblower retaliation claim before OSHA can
provide an opportunity to obtain preliminary
reinstatement. The OSHA investigative process also
enables plaintiff to discover the employer’s defenses
and possibly obtain critical admissions prior to
prosecuting related claims. Furthermore, since many of
the whistleblower retaliation claims that must be
initially filed with DOL contain a removal provision,
the whistleblower can initially pursue the claim before
DOL and later remove it to federal court.
2. Choosing a Remedy with a Favorable Causation Standard
As discussed supra, the whistleblower retaliation
statutes enacted in the past decade all employ a very
favorable causation standard for plaintiffs. To prevail,
the plaintiff must demonstrate merely that protected
conduct was a “contributing factor” in the employer’s
decision to take an adverse action. The ARB defines a
contributing factor as “any factor, which alone or in
combination with other factors, tends to affect in any
way the outcome of the decision.” Allen v. Stewart
Enterprises, Inc., ARB No. 06-081, slip op. at 17 (July
27, 2006). Close temporal proximity alone can support an
inference of causation under the “contributing factor”
standard. See, e.g., Kalkunte, 2004-SOX-56, supra. Some
state common law wrongful discharge actions, however,
require a plaintiff to meet a “sole cause” standard, a
far more onerous causation standard. Accordingly, in
selecting claims, it is important to consider adding a
claim that employs the favorable “contributing factor”
standard.
3. Naming Individual Defendants
An important consideration in choosing among retaliation
claims is whether the claim authorizes individual
liability. The retaliation provision of SOX expressly
authorizes claims against individuals, and the FERA
amendments to § 3730(h) authorize claims against
individuals. See Laborde v. Rivera-Dueno, 2010 WL
1416010 (D. P.R. Mar. 31, 2010) (post-FERA, liability is
not limited to employers). Asserting a claim against an
individual can be especially important where the
corporation might not have sufficient assets to pay a
judgment and the individual responsible for the
retaliation is covered under a Director & Officers
insurance policy. Before naming an individual as a
defendant, consider the potential impact on diversity
jurisdiction and consider whether naming an individual
defendant will often make them personally invested in
the case and could pose an obstacle to settlement. An
individual defendant might be strongly disinclined to
settle and instead prefer to litigate the claim.
B. Forum Selection
As a general rule, state courts are the preferred forum
to try whistleblower retaliation claims because jury
verdicts tends to be higher and summary judgment is less
of an obstacle when litigating in state court. While
jurors can readily relate to being the subject of an
abusive working environment, it is important to
carefully evaluate whether the plaintiff will be
likeable to a jury in the forum in which the claim would
be brought. Where the plaintiff is not likely to be
viewed favorably by a jury but the facts are strong,
litigating before a DOL ALJ might be a better option
than a jury trial because DOL ALJs are less inclined to
make emotional decisions in reaction to the employer’s
efforts to undermine the plaintiff’s motive for engaging
in protected activities or the employer’s efforts to
portray the plaintiff as a disgruntled former employee
and instead focus on the evidence. Litigating a
retaliation claim before a DOL ALJ can also be
advantageous in that ALJs typically permit the plaintiff
to take broad discovery,[12] and a plaintiff can get a
hearing on the merits before an ALJ far more
expeditiously than in federal court. In addition, DOL
ALJs usually address discovery disputes promptly, and
will permit nearly all relevant evidence to come in at
trial. Formal rules of evidence generally do not apply
in whistleblower retaliation cases tried before DOL ALJs.
Several of the recently enacted federal whistleblower
protection statutes contain a removal provision under
which the plaintiff may elect to bring the retaliation
claim de novo in federal court once the claim has been
pending before DOL for a certain period of time—180 days
for a SOX claim. That option provides the complainant an
opportunity to initially litigate the claim at DOL and
then remove it to federal court and add other deferral
claims and pendent state claims. Employers have tried to
argue that although these statutes provide for de novo
review in federal court, the decisions of the presiding
ALJ, such as an order granting a motion to dismiss or a
motion for summary decision, should be accorded
preclusive effect when the claim is removed to federal
court. The Fourth Circuit, however, has flatly rejected
this argument, holding that a SOX whistleblower may seek
de novo review in federal court so long as the complaint
has been pending for 180 days and DOL has not issued a
final decision. See Stone v. Instrumentation Lab. Co.,
591 F.3d 239, 245 (4th Cir. 2009) (deferring to
administrative agency, “even if more efficient, is in
direct conflict with the unambiguous language of
[SOX]”).
In devising a strategy to litigate whistleblower
retaliation claims, avoiding arbitration is an important
factor to consider. Whistleblower retaliation claims
bought under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act,
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, and Dodd-Frank Act are exempt from mandatory
arbitration. Accordingly, when choosing among multiple
claims, it is preferable to bring a claim that will not
be subject to arbitration. Even if a whistleblower
retaliation claim is subject to arbitration, the
plaintiff may be able initially to pursue the claim
before DOL or an Agency IG if the claim has an
administrative exhaustion provision. The DOL or an
Agency IG could award relief to the whistleblower before
the claim is submitted to arbitration, and OSHA’s orders
of preliminary reinstatement are effective immediately.
C. Claim Preemption
Federal whistleblower protection statutes do not preempt
state remedies, including a common law claim of wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy. In the leading
case addressing this issue, the Supreme Court held that
a whistleblower retaliation action under the Energy
Reorganization Act did not preempt a common law
emotional distress claim arising from the plaintiff’s
termination. English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S.
72 (1990). The Court found “no basis for [the]
contention that all state-law claims arising from
conduct covered by the [statute] are necessarily
[preempted].” 496 U.S. at 83. Accordingly, a
whistleblower can pursue remedies under both federal and
state law. Bringing a state tort action offers a
plaintiff the opportunity to obtain punitive damages in
a jury trial. Where a federal whistleblower protection
statute has an administrative exhaustion requirement,
the whistleblower may be able to initially litigate the
claim before DOL or an IG and subsequently remove the
claim to federal court and add pendent state claims.
D. Claim Preclusion
While the Fourth Circuit’s recent Stone decision
clarifies that a SOX retaliation plaintiff is entitled
to a de novo hearing in federal court after litigating
the case before a DOL ALJ (so long as DOL has not yet
issued a final order), formulating a strategy to
maximize a whistleblower’s recovery requires careful
analysis of claim preclusion. Courts seek to avoid
“claim splitting” and are reluctant to give a plaintiff
more than one bite at the apple.
For example, in Tice v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, the Third
Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the employer,
holding that a DOL ALJ’s determination that the employer
had a legitimate reason for terminating SOX plaintiff
Carol Tice’s employment should be accorded preclusive
effect in related employment actions. Tice, 325 F. App’x
114 (3d Cir. 2009). Tice had initially filed a SOX
retaliation claim with OSHA, alleging that her
employment was terminated because she opposed
management’s direction to employees to falsify sales
call reports in violation of SOX. A SOX ALJ dismissed
Tice’s claim, concluding that the employer demonstrated
that it would have terminated Tice absent her disclosure
because Tice falsified sales call reports. Tice did not
appeal the ALJ’s order and subsequently brought an
action in federal court alleging age discrimination and
gender discrimination. The summary judgment dismissal of
Tice’s discrimination claims likely could have been
avoided if Tice had appealed the DOL ALJ’s order.
Similarly, in Thanedar v. Time Warner, Inc., the Fifth
Circuit held that an unsuccessful Title VII
discrimination claim can preclude a SOX claim arising
from the same adverse action. Thanedar, 352 F App’x 891
(5th Cir. 2009). Five months after Thanedar’s Title VII
and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims were dismissed, Thanedar
removed a SOX complaint pending before OSHA to federal
district court. Time Warner moved for judgment as a
matter of law on the basis that Thanedar’s SOX and state
law claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata,
because the claims should have been asserted in his
prior Title VII lawsuit. Thanedar appealed to the Fifth
Circuit, which found that “all three of Thanedar’s
claims arise from the same core set of facts and
therefore the preclusive effect of the Title VII
judgment “extends to all rights the original plaintiff
had ‘with respect to all or any part of the transaction,
or series of connected transactions out of which the
[original] action arose.’” Id.
In general, the findings of an agency investigation do
not have preclusive effect on related claims. See, e.g.,
Hanna v. WCI Cmtys., Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25651
(S.D. Fla. Nov. 18, 2004) (holding that OSHA’s
preliminary findings in a SOX do not have preclusive
effect). But the California Supreme Court recently
issued a surprising decision holing that OSHA’s findings
in an AIR21 retaliation action barred the plaintiff from
pursuing related claims under state law because the
plaintiff had the option of a formal adjudicatory
hearing at DOL to determine the contested issues and
failed to request a hearing before DOL, thereby
rendering OSHA’s notice of determination a final order).
Murray v. Alaska Airlines Inc., 237 P.3d 565 (CA 2010).
The Murray decision will not likely be followed by other
courts, but it underscores the importance of timely
appealing agency decisions before they become final
orders.
Resolving a whistleblower retaliation action will not
preclude the whistleblower from bringing a qui tam
action. See U.S. ex rel. Lusby v. Rolls-Royce Corp., 570
F.3d 849, 852 (7th Cir. 2009). But if the government is
aware of the facts underlying a qui tam action before
the action is filed, a general release signed by the
relator may, in certain jurisdictions, waive the
whistleblower’s relator share. U.S. ex rel. Radcliffe,
et al. v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 600 F.2d 319 (4th Cir.
2010), cert. denied, 10-254, 2010 WL 3302027 (U.S. Oct.
12, 2010) (“When the government is unaware of potential
FCA claims the public interest favoring the use of qui
tam suits to supplement federal enforcement weighs
against enforcing prefiling releases. But when the
government is aware of the claims, prior to suit having
been filed, public policies supporting the private
settlement of suits heavily favor enforcement of a
pre-filing release.”). C.f. United States ex rel Green
v. Northrop 59 F.3d 953, 963-967 (9th Cir. 1995) (a
general release entered into without the knowledge or
consent of the United States, could not be enforced to
bar a later qui tam claim where the government did not
know have knowledge of the fraud prior to the filing of
the qui tam action).
E. Preserving Ability to Recover Relator Share
Where a client is both eligible for a whistleblower
reward under the False Claims Act and also has a strong
retaliation claim, counsel should carefully analyze
whether prosecuting the retaliation claim could limit
the client’s ability to obtain a whistleblower reward. A
qui tam relator can prosecute a retaliation claim
without violating the seal, but this requires planning,
including a strategy for responding to questions during
the plaintiff’s deposition about the plaintiff’s
disclosures to the government. The following are some
issues counsel should consider in prosecuting a
retaliation claim while a qui tam action is under seal:
• Before filing a retaliation claim on behalf of a
whistleblower who may have a qui tam action, the
whistleblower should disclose the fraud to the
Government to ensure that the whistleblower will qualify
as an original source.
• Consider filing the retaliation claims with the qui
tam action (under seal).
• Be prepared to justify the plaintiff’s damages with
specificity to avoid the appearance that the employer is
settling more than just an employment claim. As most
whistleblower retaliation claims authorize both
compensatory damages and front pay in lieu of
reinstatement, potential damages can be very
substantial, especially where the employer’s retaliation
damages the whistleblower’s career. A vocational
rehabilitation expert can evaluate the extent to which
the whistleblower’s career prospects have been
diminished and the time it will take for the
whistleblower to regain a comparable employer. Relying
on the opinion of the vocational rehabilitation expert,
an economist can estimate frontpay.
F. Pleading Whistleblower Retaliation Claims
While Rule 9(b) does not apply to 3730(h) or any other
retaliation cause of action, counsel for whistleblowers
are well-advised in the wake of Iqbal[13] and
Twombly[14] to plead whistleblower retaliation
complaints in detail. In a § 3730(h) action, plaintiff
should plead how plaintiff’s disclosures or plaintiff’s
investigation reasonably could lead to a viable FCA
action. See United States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91
F.3d 1261, 1269 (9th Cir. 1996). In a SOX retaliation
action, plaintiff should plead how plaintiff’s
disclosure “definitively and specifically” relates to
the SOX subject matter (such as shareholder fraud or a
violation of an SEC rule). Pleading protected conduct in
detail will also be useful in discovery disputes in that
plaintiff will be able to point to specific allegations
in the complaint as a basis to take broad discovery on
plaintiff’s disclosures.
Additionally, plaintiff should plead adverse actions in
detail, as context matters, i.e., “the significance of
any given act of retaliation will often depend upon the
particular circumstances.” Burlington N., 548 U.S. at
57. For example, changing an employee’s work hours may
be materially adverse where the change in hours would
effectively force the employee to resign. In a SOX
retaliation case, the ALJ found that the plaintiff
suffered an adverse action when he was given one day to
either resign or accept a transfer to a different
department that would significantly decrease his
workload. McClendon v. Hewlett Packard, Inc, 2006-SOX-29
(ALJ Oct. 5, 2006).
Plaintiff should also plead retaliatory actions (any act
that would dissuade a reasonable employee from
whistleblowing) that occured outside of the statute of
limitations. While such adverse actions are not
actionable, they can constitute important circumstantial
evidence of retaliation, and including them in the
complaint is important to ensure that they are
discoverable. Finally, it is critical to exhaust
administrative remedies where plaintiff is subjected to
additional adverse actions after filing a complaint.
G. Prosecuting Whistleblower Retaliation Claims
Although whistleblower retaliation statutes generally do
not require that plaintiff disclose an actual violation
of law,[15] some courts are erroneously applying a
heightened standard of objective reasonableness that
comes close to requiring plaintiff to prove that she
disclosed an actual violation of law, e.g., requiring a
§ 3730(h) plaintiff to demonstrate that her disclosures
would have resulted in a successful qui tam action.
Therefore, to survive summary judgment, it is critical
to develop evidence proving the objective reasonableness
of plaintiff’s disclosures.
Whistleblower retaliation plaintiffs are entitled to
take broad discovery about their protected disclosures,
but of course should expect defendants vigorously to
resist disclosing documents and information about the
plaintiff’s disclosures. Counsel should promptly move to
compel such evidence, and there are several strong legal
arguments to support a motion to compel. As discussed
supra, plaintiff will have to prove the objective
reasonableness of her disclosures, so therefore she must
take broad discovery about her disclosures. In addition,
courts have held that information about the plaintiff’s
disclosures is relevant to the employer’s motive for
retaliating against plaintiff. See, e.g., Dilback v.
General Electric Company, 2008 WL 4372901 (W.D. Ky.
Sept, 22, 2008) (“If Plaintiff can show that the
documents he was attempting to retrieve reveal the
existence of false claims on the part of the Defendant,
then such evidence may be probative of the Defendant’s
motivation.”).
Plaintiff should also vigorously pursue discovery about
investigations of her disclosures. For example, in a SOX
case, the employer refused to produce in discovery the
report of an internal investigation related to
plaintiff’s disclosures which the employer had submitted
to the SEC prior the plaintiff filing suit. Plaintiff
moved to compel, and the ALJ ordered production of the
report, concluding that the employer’s disclosure of the
report to the SEC waived attorney-client privilege and
work product protection, despite the presence of a
confidentiality agreement with the SEC. See Fernandez v.
Navistar Int’l Corp., 2009-SOX-43 (ALJ Oct. 16, 2009).
It is also important not to accept broad assertions of
privilege at face value and instead require employers to
produce privilege logs. A privilege log may reveal that
the employer retained outside counsel to investigate
plaintiff’s disclosures, which may be critical evidence
to prove that the employer had knowledge of the
whistleblower’s protected conduct. For example, it is
not credible for an employer to claim at trial that it
was never aware that plaintiff was disclosing violations
of securities laws where the employer promptly retained
a securities lawyer to investigate the whistleblower’s
disclosures.
Third-party discovery can also be very useful to
obtaining the evidence necessary to prove the objective
reasonableness of plaintiff’s disclosures. For example,
a SOX retaliation plaintiff alleging that she disclosed
inadequate internal accounting controls should consider
deposing the company’s independent auditors to discover
the extent to which the internal control deficiencies
she disclosed adversely impacted the accuracy of the
company’s financial reporting. Retaliation plaintiffs
should also consider obtaining information through the
Freedom of Information Act that may corroborate the
objective reasonableness of their disclosures.
In addition to taking broad discovery on the objective
reasonableness of plaintiff’s disclosures, plaintiff’s
counsel should focus discovery on eliciting evidence of
causation, including the following types of direct and
circumstantial evidence:
• Direct evidence of retaliatory motive, i.e.,
“statements or acts that point toward a discriminatory
motive for the adverse employment action.” William
Dorsey, An Overview of Whistleblower Protection Claims
at the United States Department of Labor, 26 J. Nat’l
Ass’n Admin. L. Judiciary 43, 66 (Spring 2006) (citing
Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733 (8th Cir.
2004)). As the Eighth Circuit has pointed out, direct
evidence is not the converse of circumstantial evidence,
but instead “is evidence ‘showing a specific link
between the alleged discriminatory animus and the
challenged decision, sufficient to support a finding by
a reasonable fact finder that an illegitimate criterion
actually motivated’ the adverse employment action.”
Griffith, 387 F.3d at 736. “‘[D]irect’ refers to the
causal strength of the proof, not whether it is
‘circumstantial’ evidence.” Id.
• Deviation from company policy or practice, such as
failing to apply a progressive discipline policy to the
whistleblower. During the employer’s Rule 30(b)(6)
deposition or the deposition of a Human Resources
official, plaintiff should explore relevant company
policies in detail to lay a foundation for proving that
the employer deviated from its policies. For example, a
whistleblower who is terminated for committing a minor
violation of policy, such as sending a personal email
using a work computer, should establish that the company
has a progressive disciplinary policy and that the
employer typically metes out an oral warning or no
disciplinary action to an employee who sends a personal
email from work. Similarly, explore whether the company
investigated plaintiff’s disclosures in accordance with
its policies or protocols concerning investigation of
employee concerns. A sham or biased investigation is
strong evidence of retaliation. Failure to investigate
can also be circumstantial evidence of retaliation. In
Howard v. Urban Inv. Trust, Inc., 2010 WL 832294 at *4
(N.D. Ill. 2010), the court held that the employer’s
failure to investigate or stop the harassment of the
whistleblower constitutes discrimination in the terms
and conditions of employment.
• Animus or anger towards the employee for engaging in a
protected activity. See Pillow v. Bechtel Constructions,
Inc., Case No. 1987-ERA-00035 (Sec’y July 19, 1993)
• Singling out the whistleblower for extraordinary or
unusually harsh disciplinary action. See Overall v. TVA,
ARB Nos. 98-111 and 128, ALJ No. 1997-ERA-000S3, slip
op. at 16-17 (Apr. 30, 2001), aff’d TVA v. DOL, 2003 WL
932433 (6th Cir. 2003). Obtain all relevant policies and
procedures, including the employer’s progressive
discipline policy, and determine whether the employer
failed to follow its procedures. Where your client was
subject to an adverse action for violating a particular
policy or work rule, ascertain whether the employer
meted out similar discipline against other employees who
violated the same policy or work rule.
• Proof that employees who are situated similarly to the
plaintiff, but who did not engage in protected conduct,
received better treatment. Dorsey, supra, at 71.
• Temporal proximity between the employee’s protected
conduct and the decision to take an actionable adverse
employment action. See Stone & Webster Eng’g Corp. v.
Herman, 115 F.3d 1568, 1573 (11th Cir 1997).
• The cost of taking corrective action necessary to
address the whistleblower’s disclosures and the
decision-maker’s incentive to suppress or conceal the
whistleblower’s concerns.
• Evidence that the employer conducted a biased or
inadequate investigation of the whistleblower’s
disclosures, including evidence that the person accused
of misconduct controlled or heavily influenced the
investigation.
• Shifting or contradictory explanations for the adverse
employment action. Clemmons v. Ameristar Airways, Inc.,
ARB No. 08-067, at 9, ALJ No. 2004-AIR-11 (ARB May 26,
2010) (footnotes omitted). Focus on the evolution of an
employer’s justification for an adverse action from the
inception of the litigation through discovery. For
example, an employer’s justification at an unemployment
compensation hearing or in a position statement
submitted to an agency soon after the complaint is filed
may differ significantly from the reasons asserted at
the deposition of a witness well prepared by counsel.
• Evidence of after-the-fact explanations for the
adverse employment action. In Clemmons, the ARB pointed
out that “the credibility of an employer’s
after-the-fact reasons for firing an employee is
diminished if these reasons were not given at the time
of the initial discharge decision.” Id. at 9-10
(footnotes omitted).
• Corporate culture and evidence of a pattern or
practice of retaliating against whistleblowers.
In addition to eliciting evidence of causation,
plaintiff should seek evidence in discovery that would
justify an award of punitive damages, including reckless
indifference to the federally protected rights of the
aggrieved individual or malice, which can be inferred
from outrageous conduct. The employer’s reaction to the
whistleblowing may provide evidence of malice, such as
an employer conducting a sham investigation of
plaintiff’s disclosures or an employer leveling false
accusations of misconduct against the whistleblower and
not providing the whistleblower an opportunity to
respond to such accusations. Additional conduct
warranting punitive damages includes efforts by the
employer to injure the employee post-termination,
including negative references to prospective employers
or disparagement of the plaintiff.
H. Playing Defense
While whistleblower retaliation plaintiffs often have
significant leverage in litigation, including the
prospect of far-reaching discovery about the unlawful
conduct that the whistleblower disclosed, a
straightforward retaliation case can turn into years of
expensive and hard-fought litigation. Upper management’s
animosity toward the whistleblower, an inclination to
avoid the appearance of conceding that the
whistleblower’s disclosures were legitimate, and other
factors sometimes cause employers to commit an
irrational level of resources towards defending a
whistleblower retaliation claim, including legal costs
that are several times the value of the claim. During
the intake stage and throughout the litigation, it is
critical to anticipate scorched earth tactics and to
develop a strategy to avoid permitting such tactics to
derail the litigation. The following are some tips for
playing defense:
• Advise clients early on to avoid posting anything
about their claims on social media and from commenting
about their claims in emails or text messages. Indeed, a
retaliation plaintiff should strongly consider
curtailing the use of social media while the litigation
is pending.
• With some exceptions, such as cooperation with the DOJ
or other law enforcement, it is best for a retaliation
plaintiff to obtain documents to support a retaliation
claim through the discovery process or from public
records.[16] To avoid defending a strong retaliation
case on the merits, defense counsel might use a
plaintiff’s retention of company documents as a basis to
derail the litigation. For example, the employer may
file and aggressively prosecute retaliatory
counterclaims with no value except to force a settlement
or intimidate the plaintiff. The employer may also move
for sanctions.
• Where the defendant files retaliatory counterclaims,
amend the complaint to bring a separate cause of action.
See, e.g., Darveau v. Detecon, Inc., 515 F.3d 334, 343
(4th Cir. 2008) (“filing a lawsuit alleging fraud with a
retaliatory motive and without a reasonable basis in
fact or law” constitutes an adverse employment action).
• Do not let the case focus on plaintiff’s motive.
Indeed, the ARB has repeatedly held that plaintiff’s
motive for blowing the whistle is irrelevant.[17]
• React promptly and pro-actively to defense tactics
designed to harass plaintiff. For example, where
defendant insists on subjecting the plaintiff to a
gratuitous defense medical examination (defense counsel
will refer to it as an “independent medical
examination”) in a case where plaintiff is alleging only
garden variety emotional distress damages, consider
moving for a protective order before the defendant moves
to compel the examination.[18] Similarly, consider
moving for a protective order where the defense counsel
takes extensive discovery from plaintiff’s current or
prior employers as a means to harm plaintiff’s
reputation.
• Plaintiff should be cautious in discussing the
litigation with current employees, as the employer might
use current employees to conduct informal discovery.
• During the intake process, counsel should investigate
potential pitfalls, such as untrue statements on a job
application or resume (harmful to plaintiff’s
credibility and a possible ground for an after-acquired
evidence defense), or plaintiff’s negative postings
about the employer on blogs, social media, or listservs.
• Ensure that plaintiff preserves all evidence relevant
to the claim. The idea of a “litigation hold” and the
consequences of failing to preserve electronic evidence
are foreign to most plaintiffs pursuing retaliation
claims. Therefore, counsel should explain in detail the
steps necessary to preserve evidence. Aggressive defense
counsel will question plaintiff at a deposition in
detail to establish that plaintiff did not take adequate
measures to preserve evidence and then bring a
spoliation motion in an effort to obtain dismissal or an
adverse inference.
• Plaintiff should maintain a detailed log of job search
efforts in order to prove mitigation of damages.
• Limit aggressive employer discovery concerning the
after-acquired evidence defense, which is often used as
a means to harass the plaintiff and put the plaintiff on
trial. The after-acquired evidence defense gives
employers a strong incentive to undertake extensive
discovery into a discrimination plaintiff’s character,
conduct, background and job performance to find some
misconduct that would potentially warrant cutting off
certain damages at the time the employer learned of new
information. Indeed, as suggested by Professor Hart, a
frivolous assertion of the after-acquired evidence
defense to dissuade a plaintiff from pursuing her case
may give rise to an independent retaliation claim.[19]
Conclusion
The whistleblower protection statutes enacted by
Congress in recent years has created a patchwork of many
potential claims for whistleblowers who have suffered
retaliation, with significant differences in the scope
of protected conduct, burden of proof, remedies, and
procedural requirements. The authors hope that this
article is helpful to practitioners in identifying
potential whistleblower retaliation claims and
formulating a strategy to maximize a whistleblower’s
recovery. The following table summarizes the primary
features of the whistleblower protection statutes
discussed in this article:
Statute Protected Conduct SOL Administrative Exhaustion
Remedies Jury Trial
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. No.
111-5, § 1553, 123 Stat. 115, 297-302 (2009).
Disclosures about:
»» gross mismanagement of an agency contract or grant
relating to stimulus funds;
»» gross waste of stimulus funds;
»» a substantial and specific danger to public health or
safety related to the implementation or use of stimulus
funds;
»»l an abuse of authority related to the implementation
or use of stimulus funds; or
»» a violation of a law, rule, or regulation that
governs an agency contract or grant related to stimulus
funds. None, but 4 year catchall SOL may apply Yes,
employee must file with Inspector General.
If no decision within 210 days of filing the complaint,
employee may file a complaint in federal district court.
»»Reinstatement
»» Double back pay
»» Interest on back pay
»» Special damages
»» Attorney’s fees and costs Yes
Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §
2087. (1) providing information relating to a violation
of the CPSC Reform Act or any act enforced by the
Commission to the employer, the Federal Government, or
the State Attorney general;
(2) testifying or assisting in a proceeding concerning a
violation of the CPSC Reform Act or any act enforced by
the Commission; or
(3) refusing to participate in an activity, policy,
practice, or assigned task that the employee reasonably
believes violates the CPSC Reform Act or any act
enforced by the Commission. 180 days Yes, employee must
file with DOL’s OSHA.
If no decision within 210 days of filing complaint, may
file a complaint in federal district court.
»»Reinstatement
»»Back pay
»»Special damages
»»Attorney’s fees and costs Yes
Department of Defense Authorization Act, 10 U.S.C. §
2409. Disclosure about:
»» gross mismanagement of DoD contract or grant;
»» gross waste of DoD funds;
»» substantial and specific danger to public health or
safety; or
»» violation of law related to a DoD contract or grant.
None Yes, employee must file with Inspector General.
If no decision within 210 days of filing the complaint,
employee may file a complaint in federal district court.
»»Reinstatement
»» Back pay
»» Restoration of employment benefits
»» Exemplary damages
»» Attorney’s fees and costs Yes
Statute Protected Conduct SOL Administrative Exhaustion
Remedies Jury Trial
Federal Acquisitions Streamlining Act, 41 U.S.C. § 265.
Disclosures about a substantial violation of law related
to a contract. None No private right of action.
Employee receives only an investigation by the Inspector
General. »»Reinstatement
»» Back pay
»» Attorney’s fees and costs No
False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h). »» Any efforts to
stop a violation of the FCA.
»» Being associated with someone who engaged in
protected conduct. 3 years No, employee can bring claim
in any federal district court. »»Reinstatement
»» Double back pay Interest on back »»pay
»» Special damages
»» Attorney’s fees and costs Yes
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1514(A). Disclosures
about alleged violations of the federal mail, wire,
radio, TV, bank, securities fraud statutes or any rule
or regulation of the SEC. 180 days Yes, employee must
file with DOL’s OSHA.
If no decision within 210 days of filing complaint, may
file a complaint in federal district court.
Reinstatement»»
»» Back pay with interest
»» Special damages
»» Attorney’s fees and costs Yes
Wrongful Discharge Varies by state. Examples include:
(1) exercising a statutory right, (2) refusing to engage
in illegal activity, or (3) performing a duty required
by law. State statute of limitations for tort actions.
No, employee can file in federal or state court. »» Back
pay
»» Front pay
»» Special damages
»»Punitive damages
Lacks statutory »»fee-shifting Yes
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1558. »»
Disclosures about suspected violations of Title I of the
Act.
»» Participating in investigations.
»» Objecting or refusing to participate in an activity
reasonably believed to violate Title I. 180 days Yes,
employee must file with DOL’s OSHA.
If no decision within 210 days of filing complaint, may
file a complaint in federal district court.
»»Reinstatement
»» Back pay
»» Special damages
»» Attorney’s fees and costs Yes
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act § 748. »» Disclosing information to the CFTC in
accordance with the whistleblower incentive program.
»» Assisting in any investigation or action of the CFTC
based upon or related to disclosed information. 2 years
No, employee can bring claim in any federal district
court. »»Reinstatement
»» Back pay with interest
»» Special damages
»» Attorney’s fees and costs Likely yes 20
Statute Protected Conduct SOL Administrative Exhaustion
Remedies Jury Trial
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform an Consumer Protection Act
§ 922. »» Disclosing information to the SEC in
accordance with the whistleblower incentive program
»» Initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any
investigation or action based on or related to
previously disclosed information
»» Making disclosures that are required or protected
under SOX.
»» Making disclosures that are protected or required
under any law, rule, or regulation subject to the
jurisdiction of the SEC. 3 years from the date when the
facts material to the right of action are known or
reasonably should have been known by the employee; no
more than 6 years from the date of the violation. No,
employee can bring claim in any federal district court.
»»Reinstatement
»» Double back pay with interest
»» Attorney’s fees and costs No
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform an Consumer Protection Act
§ 1057. (1) providing information relating to a
violation of the Consumer Finance Protection Act or any
law enforced by the Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection to the employer, Bureau, or any state,
federal, or local government or law enforcement agency;
(2) testifying or assisting in a proceeding concerning a
violation of the CFPA or any rule, order, standard, or
prohibition prescribed by the Bureau; (3) filing,
instituting, or causing to be filed any proceeding under
any Federal consumer finance law; or (4) refusing to
participate in an activity, policy, practice, or
assigned task that the employee reasonably (or other
such person) reasonably believes violates any law, rule,
order, standard, or prohibition subject to the
jurisdiction of, or enforceable by, the Bureau. 180 days
Yes, employee must file with DOL’s OSHA.
If no decision within 210 days of filing complaint, may
file a complaint in federal district court.
»»Reinstatement
»» Back pay with interest
»» Special damages
»» Attorney’s fees and costs Yes
________________________________________
[1]R. Scott Oswald and Jason M. Zuckerman are principals
at The Employment Law Group in Washington, D.C. (www.employmentlawgroup.com),
where they litigate whistleblower retaliation and qui
tam actions on behalf of employees.
[2]Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
[3]Prior to the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, ALJs
and federal courts were inconsistent in the application
of SOX to privately held subsidiaries of publicly traded
companies. See Johnson v. Siemens Blg. Techs., Inc., ARB
No. 08-032, ALJ No. 2005-SOX-015 (ARB Apr. 15, 2010) (ARB
solicited amicus briefs discussing proper scope of SOX
and various tests used to determine whether SOX should
apply to subsidiaries).
[4]See Klopfenstein, ARB 04-149, 2004-SOX-11 (ARB May
31, 2006).
[5]The ARB issues final agency decisions for the
Secretary of Labor and its decisions are binding on ALJs.
[6]See supra note 3 (discussing Burlington Northern
standard).
[7]Employees of credit union and depository institutions
may also have claims under the whistleblower provisions
of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act of 1989 and Federal Credit Union Act.
See 12 U.S.C. § 1831j (2001); 12 U.S.C. § 1790b(a)(1)
(2001).
[8]Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
[9]See supra Section V - Consumer Product Safety Reform
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2087.
[10]Three recent verdicts reveal that punitive damages
can be a significant component of damages in a common
law wrongful discharge action. In Carpenter v. Sandia
Nat’l Laboratories, a jury awarded Mr. Carpenter
approximately $4.4 million in a common law wrongful
termination action, which consisted of $36,000 for lost
wages, benefits and other costs, $350,000 for emotional
distress and $4 million in punitive damages. See
Carpenter v. Sandia Natl. Laboratories,
#D-202-CV-200506347, Bernalillo Co. NM Dist. Court
(verdict 2/13/2007). Mr. Carpenter alleged that he was
terminated in retaliation for cooperating with federal
authorities that were investigating Chinese cyber
intelligence efforts. In Feliciano v. Parexel
International, No. 04-CV-3798 (E.D. Pa. verdict
9/15/2008), a jury awarded $1.8 million in punitive
damages for wrongful termination, plus nearly $100,000
in compensatory damages, plus attorneys’ fees. Mr.
Feliciano alleged that he was terminated in retaliation
for complaining to his supervisors that a company
marketing database contained email addresses and other
information that was illegally obtained.
[11]Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility
has compiled a detailed survey of state whistleblower
protection statutes, which is posted at http://www.peer.org/state/index.php.
[12]See, e.g., Leznik v. Nektar Therapuetics, Inc.,
2006-SOX-93 (ALJ Feb. 9, 2007) (Order Granting Motion to
Compel) (“Unless it is clear that the information sought
can have no possible bearing on a party’s claims or
defenses, requests for discovery should be permitted.”).
[13]Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009).
[14]Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
[15]See, e.g., Graham County, supra (proving a violation
of the FCA is not element of a § 3730(h) cause of
action).
[16]The Sixth Circuit has articulated a six-factor test
to determine whether employee’s delivery of confidential
documents to his counsel in support of a discrimination
claim was protected conduct. See Niswander v. Cincinnati
Ins. Co., 529 F.3d 714, 725-26 (6th Cir. 2008); see also
Kempcke v. Monsanto Co., 132 F.3d 442, 446–47 (8th Cir.
1998) (reversing district court’s grant of summary
judgment for employer because reasonable jury could find
that employee who obtained and disseminated confidential
information engaged in protected activity under Title
VII).
[17]See Carter v. Electrical Dist. No. 2, Case No.
1992-TSC-00011, slip op. at 11 (Sec’y July 26, 1995);
Oliver v. Hydro-Vac Services, Inc., Case No.
1991-SWD-00001, slip op. at 8 (Sec’y Nov. 1, 1995).
[18]See, e.g., Flanagan v. Keller Products, Inc., (2001
DNH 2001) (plaintiff did not place her mental condition
in controversy where plaintiff renounced any claim for
damages for unusually severe emotional distress).
[19]Melissa Hart, Retaliatory Litigation Tactics: The
Chilling Effects of “After- Acquired Evidence”, 40 Ariz.
St. L.J. 401 (2008).
[20] While § 748 of the Dodd-Frank Act does not
explicitly grant the right to a jury trial, the ARB’s
decision in Kalkunte—affirming the ALJ’s award of
damages for “pain, suffering, mental anguish, the effect
on her credit [due to losing her job], and the
humiliation she suffered”—shows that special damages can
include compensatory damages. Kalkunte, 2004-SOX-056
(2009). If compensatory damages are sought, likely the
plaintiff would be entitled to a jury trial.
Contact Us 24/7
1-888-603-0983
Toll Free: 1-888-603-0983
Phone: 202-331-3911
Fax: 202-261-2835
ABOUT THE FIRM
The Employment Law Group® law firm represents employees nationally who have blown the whistle on corporate fraud and abuse and who have been the victims of discrimination, harassment, or other violations of their civil rights. With offices in Washington, D.C., San Francisco, and Los Angeles, California, The Employment Law Group® law firm’s seasoned trial attorneys have earned a highly desirable record of favorable settlements and verdicts on behalf of its clients.